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A B S T R A C T : 
This article considers the political and practical challenges inherent in 
large-scale multinational interventions executed by western powers, 
aimed at addressing regional instability through the application of mil-
itary power to provide or restore local security. Reflecting upon recent 
well-publicised instances of such interventions, some of which have 
delivered otiose and often disappointing outcomes, it explores the ef-
ficacy of more limited interventions targeted at very specific problems. 
The authors argue in favour of a different style of security intervention: 
tightly focused, developed locally, delivered in partnership with com-
munity stakeholders and elected representatives – an approach that is 
reliant upon the contribution made by expert practitioners drawn from 
a range of contributing nations. This style of intervention remains vul-
nerable to external interference and malign political influence. Never-
theless, it is a model of international cooperation tested and proven to 
work if a conducive environment for implementation is established 
with support from inter-governmental organisations. 
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Through the latter years of the twentieth century and early years of the twenty-
first century, there have been a number of high-profile multinational interven-
tions by the international community in countries deemed to be sufficiently un-
stable to present a threat to global peace or, more controversially, to local pop-
ulations. Beginning with the tardy but largely successful intervention in the Yu-
goslav civil war in 1990 and culminating in the soon to conclude intervention in 
Afghanistan after the Al Qaeda attacks on the USA in 2001, there have also been 
military interventions in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011. The list is not exhaustive. 
There have been other interventions elsewhere, but these particular examples 
of military intervention mainly conducted by western powers provide illuminat-
ing insights into the success and, sometimes, the failure of such multinational 
security responses to perceived international threats. 
Conflict and Collapse in the Balkans 
Following the death in 1980 of Yugoslavia’s communist dictator Marshall Tito, 
the country gradually began to descend into political infighting, instability and 
a gradual fragmentation along strong ethnic and religious divisions. With na-
tionalist groups winning multi-party elections in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin 
wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the stage was set for a very violent 
break-up of the country. On 25 June 1991, the parliaments of Croatia and Slo-
venia declared independence, triggering war with Serbia. The Serbian/Croatian 
conflict endured for four years but even worse was to come. Bosnia Herze-
govina, a far more ethnically diverse state, descended into a three-way conflict 
involving ethnic Croats, Serbs and Muslim Bosniaks. The state capital, Sarajevo, 
was under siege for 44 months, in which time at least 10,000 were killed in 
shelling and small arms fire.1 
Although the collapse of Yugoslavia into conflict and chaos did not immedi-
ately threaten any of the European North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
member countries, old ties and allegiances dating back to the Habsburg and Ot-
toman empires began to exert their influence. Germany was the first NATO 
member to recognise Croatian independence on 19 December 1991, further ex-
acerbating existing regional tensions. After much procrastination among Eu-
rope’s leaders and evidence of a growing number of atrocities taking place dur-
ing the fighting, an end to the conflict was finally brought about by a NATO aerial 
bombing campaign in August 1995, followed by a US-brokered peace deal. Re-
solving the conflict through the more desirable route of a United Nations (UN) 
security council resolution was not regarded as a viable option due to historical 
links between communist Yugoslavia and the now defunct Soviet Union and still 
older ties between Orthodox Russia and Orthodox Serbia.2 When the Serbian 
(and majority ethnic-Albanian) province of Kosovo broke away from Serbia in 
1999, triggering another bout of intense fighting, a NATO military intervention 
neutralising the Serbian military followed a lot quicker.3 
Whilst outside military (via NATO) intervention in the Balkan wars can be said 
to have been successful in stopping the conflict and bringing lasting peace and 
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democratic government to the region, for some in western Europe and the Bal-
kan states themselves, the NATO actions had unpleasant echoes of previous 
great power imperialist interference and rivalries in the old Yugoslavia. Moreo-
ver, many citizens in European Union countries remembered all too well that 
NATO was established, among other things, to prevent the future bombing of a 
European capital city, not actually to organise and carry out such an attack. Nev-
ertheless, military success in the Balkan wars of the 1990s proved difficult if not 
impossible to replicate in other areas of the globe such as Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Somalia. 
Afghanistan: The Unwinnable War 
Following the shock and horror of the Islamist terror group Al Qaeda’s attack on 
targets in the USA in September 2001, the NATO powers launched a joint oper-
ation against the group’s bases in Afghanistan and those of the Taliban regime 
that held sway over most of the country following the Soviet withdrawal in 
1989. Initially, the operation was intended to neutralise the terrorist threat 
posed to the western powers by Al Qaeda. Whilst there was no specific UN Se-
curity Council resolution authorising military intervention in Afghanistan, it was 
universally accepted that the USA had a legal right to self-defence under UN 
article 51.4 However, over time and perhaps with insufficient regard to the Rus-
sian experience of intervening in the country, the remit of this military interven-
tion conducted by the United States and her allies expanded greatly to become 
a wide-ranging nation-building enterprise. Since that first military deployment 
in 2001, 2,300 American service personnel have lost their lives 5 in the country, 
with another 20,000 receiving injuries. There have been 456 British service per-
sonnel killed in the same period.6 With Afghanistan still politically unstable and 
still enduring a Taliban insurgency in 2021, western leaders must wonder what 
benefits they and their citizens have accrued from such a lengthy and costly 
deployment. From that initial tightly defined military mission back in 2001, the 
western presence in Afghanistan has sought to develop a new (western) system 
of education and to inculcate local people with western liberal notions of gen-
der equality and human rights. Commenting on the NATO intervention in the 
Balkans in the 1990s, Allin observes that 
After the traumas inflicted upon these societies, it would be facile to suggest 
that the protecting powers can organise functioning states based on Western 
ideals of multi-ethnic tolerance any time in the foreseeable future.7 
So true, except that this self-evident fact apparently escaped the notice of all 
the diplomats, military leaders and policymakers that the western powers de-
ployed to Afghanistan. A 2019 article in the New York Times 8 posed the ques-
tion: what did the US get for $2 Trillion in Afghanistan? The article noted the 
billions of dollars spent on countering narcotics production, infrastructure de-
velopment, education and training programmes, the training of soldiers and po-
lice officers; yet, after all that expenditure (of borrowed money), Afghanistan 
still produces around 80 % of global opium supplies, the army and police are 
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unable to provide a basic level of security, and the majority of Afghan citizens 
still live in grinding poverty. By any yardstick, the American-led intervention in 
Afghanistan—aimed to improve both regional and global security—has ended 
in disappointment and failure. 
The Difficult Path to Police Reform 
Of course, it could be fairly argued that the challenges posed by the situation in 
Afghanistan (and perhaps less so in Iraq) demanded a large-scale military inter-
vention and that nothing less could have been reasonably contemplated by the 
international community. That may be so, but after the initial military campaign, 
in both cases a more limited and light-touch approach could have delivered dif-
ferent results. To go from a complete absence of anything that might resemble 
to western eyes a functioning modern police service to what has become the 
Afghan National Police (ANP), a large and very imperfect organisation, required 
a vast effort by nations involved in reconstructing Afghanistan.9 As has been 
pointed out elsewhere,10 policing cannot operate as a stand-alone institution. 
Effective policing requires the support of an independent judiciary, state pros-
ecutors, an official inspectorate or oversight body, a strong civil society and ro-
bust free press to hold the service to account, as well as political support, free 
from interference in operational decision making. These things are challenging 
to provide in wealthy and developed countries and almost impossible to provide 
elsewhere. So it is reasonable to ask why it was ever seen as a realistic proposi-
tion to establish a western-style policing organisation in a war-torn and unstable 
country like Afghanistan. Strengthening and supporting traditional systems of 
social control might have proved to be more effective. Still, it would have re-
quired international policymakers to abandon any semblance of ideological in-
put and simply aim for a modest improvement in local security. 
Success or Failure: How Multinational Security Initiatives Can Succeed 
By acknowledging the enormous challenges inherent in large-scale multina-
tional interventions and the difficulties in delivering tangible and lasting im-
provements to safety and security for local populations, international policy-
makers may shift the focus of their attention and collective efforts towards 
more limited initiatives. Such an approach would, almost inevitably, leave some 
problems unresolved. It might also lead to continuing instability and ongoing 
conflict. However, it could and should be argued that some improvement in se-
curity is preferable to no improvement and that longer time frames (and prob-
ably, bigger budgets) could still lead to permanent improvements and sustaina-
ble development. There are certainly examples of multinational security initia-
tives that have demonstrated great promise showcasing international and 
multi-agency cooperation and multinational joint working that have been es-
tablished around some fairly modest goals. Rather than the grand strategy in-
terventions that can so easily come adrift in countries such as Iraq and Afghan-
istan, more locally-focused programmes of work, that are tightly defined and 
aimed at resolving a very specific problem, would seem to offer a far greater 
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chance of success. The case study outlined below provides an illuminating ex-
ample of how this approach can work. No great claims are being made here 
about transferability or how such a programme could be replicated in other ar-
eas or jurisdictions; this is simply intended to illustrate what can be achieved. 
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a vast 
multinational security organisation with 57 member states, including Russia, the 
USA and all 27 member states of the European Union. 
The OSCE traces its origins to the détente phase of the early 1970s, 
when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 
was created to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotia-
tion between East and West. Meeting over two years in Helsinki and 
Geneva, the CSCE reached agreement on the Helsinki Final Act, which 
was signed on 1 August 1975. This document contained a number of 
key commitments on politico-military, economic, environmental and 
human rights issues that became central to the so-called ‘Helsinki pro-
cess’. It also established ten fundamental principles (the ‘Decalogue’) 
governing the behaviour of States towards their citizens, as well as to-
wards each other. Until 1990, the CSCE functioned mainly as a series 
of meetings and conferences that built on and extended the participat-
ing States’ commitments, while periodically reviewing their implemen-
tation. However, with the end of the Cold War, the Paris Summit of 
November 1990 set the CSCE on a new course. In the Charter of Paris 
for a New Europe, the CSCE was called upon to play its part in managing 
the historic change taking place in Europe and responding to the new 
challenges of the post-Cold War period, which led to its acquiring per-
manent institutions and operational capabilities. As part of this institu-
tionalisation process, the name was changed from the CSCE to the 
OSCE by a decision of the Budapest Summit of Heads of State or Gov-
ernment in December 1994.11 
One of the specific functions of the OSCE was the promotion of human rights 
throughout the OSCE region. To deliver on this objective, the OSCE established 
an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The ODIHR too 
was sub-divided into different departments for delivering on particular areas of 
work. One of these was a sub-unit titled Tolerance and Non-Discrimination. The 
sub-unit consisted of a small team of people drawn from across member states, 
most with a background in non-governmental organisations (NGOs), working to 
improve the lives of various minority or persecuted groups. Some team mem-
bers had specific skills either as human rights lawyers or legal advocates. 
In early 2005, the Head of the Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Desk 
teamed up with a New Jersey-based consultancy called the National Public 
Safety Strategy Group. Working together and in collaboration with NGOs and 
subject matter experts from across Europe, they produced a training curriculum 
for combatting hate crime aimed at law enforcement officers from across the 
OSCE region. As a crime phenomenon, hate crime was not new. However, con-
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ceptually the evolution of an appropriate and effective law-enforcement re-
sponse was both radical and new with the realisation across police organisa-
tions throughout the OSCE that a more robust and targeted approach was 
needed to reduce the incidence of hate crimes which were often motivated by 
longstanding inter-ethnic, religious, cultural, national and political enmities that 
had in some cases been centuries in the making. The intention behind this new 
initiative, dubbed the Law Enforcement Officer Programme for Combatting 
Hate Crime (LEOP-CHC), was to induct a picked team of police trainers drawn 
from OSCE member states to deliver the training programme in any OSCE coun-
try that identified a need for such training and extended an invitation to the 
LEOP team to come to the national police academy and deliver the training 
course for trainers. 
The programme began in earnest in April 2005 when ODIHR officials con-
vened a meeting at their headquarters in Warsaw, Poland. Invited were police 
officer representatives from Canada, France, Hungary, Spain and Great Britain. 
Also in attendance were experts and academics from the USA and Great Britain. 
The initial cohort of attending police officers was intended to form the nucleus 
of the training delivery team. The attendees had been selected and assigned to 
the project by their respective governments: interior or police ministries. This 
was, in fact, a seminal moment that was likely to influence the success or failure 
of the programme from the very outset. At this key point, the entire initiative 
could have foundered. Bringing together a rather random selection of police 
officials from different countries with very different police organisations and 
professional cultures, not to mention national cultures and languages, was, to 
say the least, a high-risk gamble. The potential for almost immediate disagree-
ments, inter-service rivalries, personal and professional antagonisms as well as 
general misunderstandings was considerable. 
In fact, something very different occurred. The assembled group bonded al-
most straight away. A strong and collegiate working relationship evolved which 
further developed into deep and lasting friendships between all the participat-
ing officers. This may have been due to simple luck, or to the professionalism of 
those involved, or to the careful selection of those put forward to attend. Per-
haps all those dynamics were at play; nevertheless, it was and remains an ex-
ceptional example of international cooperation on a hugely complex and vital 
aspect of international law enforcement and crime prevention. The excellent 
working relationship that developed in the training team soon led to successful 
efforts to encourage the uptake of the programme in the police academies 
where the training was piloted and rolled out. Trust between officers was 
quickly established, and this high level of trust encouraged participants to take 
some bold initiatives. This included inviting community groups, gay rights cam-
paigners, religious minorities, women’s groups and others to come into the 
training sessions to share their stories, accounts of past injustices, their fears 
and concerns and their criticisms of the police. These sessions provided hugely 
powerful learning experiences for the assembled police officers and provided 
some, often uncomfortable, feedback direct from the citizens. This entire pro-
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cess was strengthened considerably by the honesty and candour of police offic-
ers from the UK, France, Canada and the USA (drawn from the core group of 
LEOP trainers), sharing personal accounts of poor practice and unprofessional 
behaviour in their own organisations that had resulted in police failures. 
It is a sad fact that having created something so strong and potentially so 
successful, over subsequent years, the ODIHR set about consistently undermin-
ing and ultimately destroying the very programme that they had so painstak-
ingly put together. The precise reasons for this remain unclear, but it is reason-
able to infer from later events that international politics, personal prejudices 
and internal power struggles all contributed to the ultimate demise of the pro-
ject. 
The rollout of the training programme began in May 2005 with delivery in 
two pilot sites, the Crime Prevention Academy in Budapest, Hungary and the 
National Police Academy in Madrid, Spain. These pilot training sessions aimed 
to prove the concept, refine and further develop the curriculum, and test out 
the working dynamics of the newly formed cadre of police trainers. The pilot 
training sessions were a success, and the new programme was now offered 
more widely to member states. The detailed programme stages of the project 
consisted of: 
• A consultation with major stakeholders to the programme, including gov-
ernment officials, police leaders (senior command and front-line officers), 
NGOs and representatives of affected communities;  
• This was followed by a detailed orientation phase involving senior staff 
from strategic areas of the police service to identify relevant current na-
tional legislation, capacities to respond to and investigate hate crimes, and 
challenges as well as opportunities facing programme implementation; 
• From here would develop a customised training curriculum for each partic-
ipating state, based upon specific needs as identified through project con-
sultation and the orientation phases; 
• Design and delivery of a train-the-trainer programme for each participating 
state would follow with input from designated stakeholders, including 
trainers and learners; 
• This would be incorporated into training manuals, handouts, and multime-
dia presentation tools; 
• Finally, there would be a provision of post-training support through the 
ODIHR website, including the sharing of best practices from other jurisdic-
tions, as well as training-relevant resources and tools.  
Of course, the actual adoption and implementation of the LEOP-CHC training 
package and associated policy changes was something that had to proceed 
through numerous political and diplomatic filters in each of the participating 
states. The OSCE operates through a system of unanimous agreement among 
member states before action can be taken. Such an approach places an imme-
diate brake upon the scope and range of interventions that the organisation can 
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implement. It is a tribute to all those involved that the LEOP programme was 
successfully delivered and embedded in Croatia, Bosnia and Poland. Tentative 
steps were made to introduce the programme in Ukraine, Serbia, the Czech Re-
public, North Macedonia and Romania. Training seminars to support the expan-
sion and promulgation of the training policy doctrine and training approach 
were held in Toronto, Paris, London and Warsaw. However, by the end of 2009, 
the initiative had stalled, and the training team was abruptly abandoned. 
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons why the success of this programme 
was so short-lived and why the ODIHR took the decision to abandon it just as it 
was gaining support and momentum. The most likely reasons are depressingly 
familiar. A change in the leadership at the ODIHR brought in new people to key 
posts. Individuals from different member states with different ideas and, no 
doubt, a desire to establish their own ideas and initiatives. One of the key 
strengths of the LEOP-CHC strategy was that it utilised police professionals to 
encourage and develop the professional knowledge and understanding of their 
colleagues in police organisations and academies across the OSCE region. As 
mentioned above, most of the ODIHR staff were drawn from NGOs and activist 
groups. For many of these people, the police were a problem, and outside in-
tervention from enlightened western liberals was needed to re-educate the po-
lice and correct their professional shortcomings. The obvious weakness in this 
approach, and one that the LEOP method was designed to avoid, is that very 
quickly police officers become resistant to outside interference and hostile to 
implied criticism from those who have no knowledge or understanding of the 
challenges inherent in the policing profession, wherever it is conducted. New 
staff at the ODIHR began the process again, developing a training programme 
called Training Against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement (TAHCLE)12 in 2009, 
which is still being used today. This drew on expertise provided by a different 
set of academics and civil society experts but sought to achieve the same basic 
goals. 
Conclusions 
It would be unfair and inaccurate to claim that international interventions, often 
by a coalition of the willing, either through authority granted by a UN security 
council resolution or without one, always result in further instability and loss of 
life. The NATO intervention to halt ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s is a case in point. One could argue that action could have been taken 
sooner and that too much effort was expended in trying to propitiate Serb mil-
itants; nevertheless, it is a self-evident fact that the Balkan republics that have 
emerged from the wreckage of communist Yugoslavia are now stable demo-
cratic and reasonably prosperous countries. The same, unfortunately, cannot 
be said of Afghanistan or Iraq, Somalia or Libya. In all four of these countries, 
the people continue to suffer in poverty, corruption, political instability, human 
rights abuses and an absence of even basic levels of security. What seems cer-
tain is that despite the mobilisation of immense political, social and economic 
effort, the positive outcomes accruing from international interventions in the 
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world’s trouble spots are often extremely nebulous and difficult to discern. 
There is a tendency amongst many western politicians to reach for the grand 
strategic plan, a hugely ambitious programme of work intended to alleviate a 
vast range of political and societal problems. On occasion, such an approach 
may work, may indeed be essential to restore regional or global stability. How-
ever, in democratic countries, voter resistance, if not outright hostility to such 
largescale interventions, may cause political leaders to pause for thought. Of 
course, the compulsion to act, to execute the grand strategic move, may on oc-
casions become politically irresistible. Nevertheless, wise counsel would and 
should encourage a more carefully calibrated approach. A lot can be achieved 
with a limited budget, carefully targeted intervention and positive collaboration 
between international experts and supportive local stakeholders. The case 
study outlined above provides a glimmer of what can be positively achieved and 
successfully delivered for vulnerable communities exposed to crime and inse-
curity. Law enforcement professionals consciously sitting outside the arena of 
domestic or international politics can and have worked successfully together on 
complex and wide-ranging security challenges. Collaboration with local stake-
holders through, where necessary, the evolution of careful trust-building 
measures is an essential prerequisite for successful policy interventions. It is a 
fact that few countries outside of NATO have either the capacity or capability 
to project military force globally. As a consequence, most UN-sanctioned mili-
tary expeditions are conducted by a coalition of the willing, all too often com-
posed of the USA and its closest allies. As illustrated above, these interventions 
can result in positive and tangible improvements in community security and 
public safety. To work in an enduring and sustainable way, this type of interven-
tion must be supported by seamless on-the-ground work programmes that in-
volve a range of different actors, from the international community; soldiers, 
police officers, diplomats and civil servants. From the local community, a wide 
range of state officials, as well as political leaders, civil society organisations, 
and individual citizens need to be included. Importantly, funding allocations 
must be appropriate to the task and budgets maintained long enough to embed 
permanent change. 
Postscript 
Since the end of the LEOP-CHC programme in 2009, the team members have 
remained in contact and continued to work collaboratively on various police 
training missions across the globe. In 2021 they published a new book on police 
reform: James J. Nolan, Frank Crispino, and Timothy Parsons, Policing in an Age 
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